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THE NATIONAL LAW LiBRARY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW FOR THE
MODERN READER. Edited by Roscoe Pound,' Nathan Isaacs,2 and
William W. Beardsley.3 New York: P. F. Collier & Son Corp.
1939. Volume I, THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COIMMON LAW.
By Roscoe Pound. Pp. xvii, 347. Volume II, CRIME AND CRIMINAL
LAW. By Morris Ploscowe.4 Pp. xiv, 377. Volume III, PUBLIC
LAW. By Howard L. Bevis.5 Pp. xxiv, 477. Volume IV, BUSINESS
LAW. By Nathan Isaacs. Pp. xvi, 351. Volume V, PROPERTY.
By Francis S. Philbrick6 Pp. xiii, 505. Volume VI, LEGAL RELA-
TIONS: CONTRACTS, TORTS AND TRUSTS (Part I). By Nathan
Isaacs. THE COMMON LAW OF THE FAMILY (Part II). By Max
Radin.7 Pp. xiv, 43i. $I5.O0.
A consideration of these volumes, which has made up in duration what
it may have lacked in intensive effort, has brought me to only one sure
conclusion, namely, that I should not have undertaken the task of re-
view. For what legal training I have is enough to make me unfitted for
the business in hand. I cannot avoid the lawyer's reaction that law
books intended primarily for the layman are too epitomized to be satisfy-
ing to the legal mind (so-called) and I find, as usual, that I tend to like
least the discussion of the subjects about which I think I know most.
But no one of my lay friends to whom I appealed for help was willing
to act as guinea-pig; not one could be induced to venture beyond the
first page or two. Hence I can present only my own undoubtedly biased
reactions. In brief, I fear that, notwithstanding some quite attractive
features, this series does run into the difficulties which seem to beset all
attempts to set forth technical subjects for the benefit of the non-expert.
It is at once too good and not good enough- too good to enthrall the
lay, and too limited to satisfy the legal, reader.
Even though I do have this general reaction, I hasten to add that
many things about the way in which these authors have approached their
task quite intrigue me. Scholars of distinguished reputation, such as
these, of course would not stoop to mere popularization. But even fur-
ther, it seems that each author, given the necessary limitations of space,
has determined that nevertheless he will go his own gait, though the
humble layman is left far behind. Therefore, the separate individuali-
ties of the auth6rs show through the printed page most delightfully, from
their general philosophical approaches down even to their predilections
as to the use of footnotes. As to the latter, we find some, the philoso-
phers perhaps, eschewing all such legal baggage; others, maybe just pro-
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fessors, appearing with the usual bottom-page seasoning of notes (though
briefer, thank God); while others, the social scientists it seems, furnish
their alibis as end-pieces to their monographs, thus subtly hinting that
reader perusal is neither necessary nor expected. And so we find inter-
esting and attractive differences throughout the several studies. Thus,
the first volume offers Dean Pound's broad sweep of the whole common
law in his well-known encyclopaedic fashion; while the fifth volume, by
Professor Philbrick, makes no concession to a possible limited percep-
tion of his audience, for the author plunges at once into the difficulties
and controversies of legal analysis, with a very scholarly critique of vari-
ous usages and proposals. One should like to hear the ordinary prudent
layman's reaction to the table of Hohfeld terms or to the learned con-
trast of" the Hohfeldian "with " the Kocourekian " privilege. At least,
it's good discipline for him.
The authors' stand upon principle (their own) compels my admiration.
They can view their product without shame -which is not the case
with the usual law dished up for the layman. In his General Introduc-
tion, Dean Pound condemns books of the " Everyman His Own Lawyer
type" and pleads for surveys which " aim at a systematic review of the
law as a whole, from an analytical, a historical, and a philosophical
standpoint." "Law is experience developed by reason and reason tested
by experience" and both of these have cooperated in the history of
civilization to establish "modes " and "precepts" for ordering human
conduct and adjusting human relations. Hence, "it is a chief function
of an encyclopaedic survey to set forth and explain these universal or
pervading precepts."
One should therefore ask how well the purpose has been achieved;
and if one finds himself hesitating in his answer, he should ask further
whether any different execution would have better served the purpose.
I put the questions in this manner because my first reaction was a feeling
that there was question about the result, that no broad general synthesis,
with corollary conclusions from each of the fields treated, seemed to
appear -in short, that the precepts discovered were not so much uni-
versal and pervading as individual insights of men of differing points
of view. And that is true; but when I think of the answer to the second
question, I doubt if I would state that another course is preferable. In
other words, we do have some seven different essays by six authors, a
situation which will naturally (and desirably) bring us down from the
universal to the individual and particular.
Of course, it is true that Dean Pound's history of the common law in
the first volume does tie together all the threads of human and legal
experience. But the others have not followed his lead in developing their
subjects; they have pursued their own bent. Thus, Mr. Ploscowe gives
us a well rounded and complete treatment of the subject of crime in
modem society, with a definite point of view throughout. In some ways,
this is the essay which best held my interest, because it had little of the
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law of crime as such, and it did have a brief but trenchant analysis of
the whole social problem involved. Again, Professor Isaacs in his volume
on Business Law gives an unusually clear orientation of the approach
and of the reactions of the business community to the legal precedents,
with the latter subordinated to the evaluation of business devices which
the law recognizes. In his brief essay on Contracts, Torts and Trusts, he
achieves a tour de force by covering the law of contracts in 40 pages, the
law of torts in less than, and the law of trusts in slightly more than 20
pages - and quite admirably, too, for his purpose. But such an ap-
proach is wholly different from that pursued, for example, by Professor
Philbrick in his scholarly study of Property. I found much of interest
to the legal mind in the latter volume, but I was rather impressed by the
author's reliance on ancient views, even to the disregard of modem au-
thorities in such subjects as covenants running with the land, licenses,
and easements. And I found President Bevis' treatment of Public Law
brief and not overfertile, perhaps a necessary result in view of the scope
of the subjects so briefly treated. His field included not merely matters
ordinarily taught in law school courses in Public Law, but also the devel-
opment of administrative agencies, the law of judicial procedure, and
International Law- all set forth in a little over 400 pages. The task
of covering due process of law from Runnymede to the New Deal in 6
pages is not a light one. The same can be said of treating code procedure
in 5 pages, and the new Federal Rules in a single paragraph. Neverthe-
less, ancient common-law and equity procedure fare somewhat better,
with a trifle less than 20 pages allotted them.
We cannot expect, therefore, a complete synthesis of all pervading
precepts, because each author necessarily refracts the light which comes
to him with the equipment his own personality affords. But this very
feature makes the essays come alive as no mere elementary or simplified
law book ever does. Hence I think the chief interest of these volumes is
likely to be for the lawyer, rather than for the layman. And if the legal
reader approaches them not in the hope of discovering new fields and
vistas open before him, he will find many valuable nuggets, indeed an
increasing number on each reading. I found, for example, in the second
volume such things as the informed criticism of the office of coroner which
I expected, but then suddenly I discovered a critique of the common law
of rape as applied in modern society, which I did not expect and which
gave me new viewpoints. Very likely this is because of my own deficien-
cies here, but I should prophesy other such discoveries for other readers,
no matter how well-informed they may be.
There are typical lawyers' aids throughout the series in the way of
citation and of quotation - aids whose utility for the layman is more
doubtful. One, of course, cannot object to the reprinting of the Consti-
tution of the United States as an appendix to the volume on Public Law
-how many times has that great document been reprinted, how many
times has it been re-read? But over ioo pages of reprints of Uniform
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Laws in the Business Law volume is likely to repel more than it attracts
or even informs. And one wonders at the wealth of indices - ample in
each of the first five volumes and a full combined index of 266 pages in
the last volume. But a reviewer should always find lack of adequate in-
dexing, not the contrary, shouldn't he?
CHARLES E. CLARX.*
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE. By
Armistead M. Dobie ' and Mason Ladd.' St. Paul: West Publishing
Co. 1940. Pp. lxiv, 1091. $6.oo.
When the Supreme Court, in 1938, turned federal jurisprudence
topsy-turvy, the effects were felt in many quarters, including the aca-
demic halls. When, by the promulgation of the Federal Rules, uniform-
ity in procedure replaced conformity to state practice, and by the decision
in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, conformity to state substantive law replaced
the general federal "common law," new collections of materials were
needed for the course in Federal Jurisdiction and for the course in Civil
Procedure. Judge Dobie and Dean Ladd have met the need as to the
former course - and met it excellently - in this timely casebook.
Although it retains in large measure the basic organization and back-
ground materials of Judge Dobie's earlier casebook on Federal Procedure,
the new book represents, nevertheless, a fresh appraisal of the field, and
places in proper relation the new developments in case and statutory
law. To Judge Dobie's full notes in the first edition have been added
citations to and quotations from recent material and references to prac-
tically all relevant law review discussion appearing since the first edition.
Careful cutting of the cases and the use of excellent text comments keep
the book from over-bulkiness.
Of course, entirely new is the collection of materials on the Substantive
Law Applied in the Federal Courts (c. 5) and on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (c. 6 et passim.). Although considerable development
has occurred in both fields since the book went to press, the materials pre-
sented furnish in general a fine and well-organized framework for the
later cases; indeed, in some instances current decisions have been spe-
cifically anticipated.3 Among the other sections which are new or which
* United States Circuit judge for the Second Circuit.
3- United States Circuit judge for the Fourth Circuit; formerly Dean of the
University of Virginia Law School.
2 Professor and Dean of the College of Law, University of Iowa.
3 See, for example, the suggestion (p. 271, n. 87) that under the wider joinder
provisions of the Federal Rules the amounts of all claims which may be joined in
one action might well be regarded as determinative of jurisdictional amount. This
has since been held to be the case with respect to claims joinable by a single plaintiff,
although aggregation of the claims of several permissive parties has not been per-
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